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Abstract
Contrary to standard theoretical reasoning, recent empirical research shows that nancial
integration is associated with higher consumption volatility in developing countries. This paper
illustrates how domestic credit market imperfections can alter the standard predictions about
the consumption smoothing possibilities under nancial autarky and international nancial in-
tegration. I use a two country international real business cycle model where the non-traded
sector in the small country faces borrowing constraints due to contract enforceability problems.
If the international risk-sharing opportunities are nonexistent, households can secure themselves
against the shocks in the non-traded sector only by adjusting their labor eort, which leads to
changes in sectorial output and terms of trade. The deterioration of the terms of trade acts as
a dampening eect on consumption, causing it to be less volatile under nancial autarky rela-
tive to nancial integration. Under nancial integration, international nancial assets provide
the insurance against domestic productivity shocks without aecting the relative prices, hence
allowing the consumption to react more.
Key Words: Financial integration, consumption smoothing, credit market frictions, emerging
markets, RBC models.
JEL Classication: F41
Acknowledgement: I am grateful to Fabio Ghironi, Peter Ireland and Fabio Schiantarelli for
continuous help and advice. I would like to thank Matteo Iacoviello, Ayhan Kose, Luisa
Lambertini, Enrique Mendoza for helpful discussions and comments. Also I would like to
thank conference participants at SED 2006, seminar participants at Bogazici University,
Drexel University, North Carolina State University, UNC Chapel Hill, Sabanci University
for useful comments. All errors are mine.
Email: alebleb@ncsu.edu. Correspondence: Department of Economics, North Carolina State University, Campus
Box 8110, Raleigh, NC 27695. Phone: 919-513-2867. Fax: 919-515-7873.1 Introduction
One of the perceived benets of nancial integration is international risk-sharing and consumption
smoothing. Financial integration provides access to a wider range of assets, which act as cushion
against domestic shocks. Theoretical studies (Mendoza (1994), Baxter and Crucini (1995), and
Sutherland (1998)) have shown that the diversication of assets generates a lower consumption
volatility compared to a nancially less integrated system or a nancial autarky. Empirical studies,
on the other hand, have not robustly established a negative relationship between nancial openness
and consumption volatility for a large set of countries. While some evidence suggests that lower
consumption volatility is associated with greater nancial openness in developed economies, the
results for developing countries are less optimistic. In their empirical study, Kose, Prasad and
Terrones (2003) show that higher levels of nancial integration in the 1990s are associated with
higher consumption volatility relative to output volatility for developing countries. For a similar
group of emerging markets, Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2006) demonstrate that there is a weak
positive correlation between the ratio of consumption growth volatility to income growth volatility
and some forms of capital account openness.1
The purpose of this paper is to analyze how credit market imperfections in developing economies
can alter the regular consumption-smoothing mechanisms provided by nancial integration, and
ask whether they are able to provide an explanation for the absence of a signicant decrease, or
an increase, in consumption volatility in the case of nancial integration. The theoretical exercise
shows that given the frictions, aggregate consumption and consumption relative to output can
be more volatile under nancial integration for certain parametrizations. The mechanism works
through dierent relative price dynamics generated endogenously under nancial integration and
nancial autarky.
The model I develop in the paper is a two country real business cycle model, where one of the
countries represents an emerging market economy. This smaller economy features two credit market
imperfections that are characteristic of developing countries as shown by Tornell and Westermann
(2003). First, I assume that the non-traded sector rms cannot borrow internationally; they are
1See the next section for a more detailed summary of the evidence in these studies.
1bound to the domestic nancial system for any borrowing requirements. I assume, moreover,
that when they borrow from the domestic nancial system, they face collateral constraints due
to contract enforcement problems. As in Tornell and Westermann (2003), their borrowing cannot
exceed a given proportion of their existing capital stock. These frictions make the non-traded sector
inherently more volatile. Financial integration aects how the households respond to this volatility.
I analyze the impact of nancial integration on the emerging market country by comparing two
scenarios. The rst setup depicts a nancial autarky where the economy is closed to trading of
any international assets. The second scenario involves nancial integration, where the households
are allowed to hold international state contingent portfolios, and hence are able to fully insure
themselves against domestic risks that are amplied by the nancial imperfections.2 In the autarky
scenario, however, where the international risk-sharing opportunities are nonexistent, households
can secure themselves only by adjusting their labor eort, which leads to changes in sectorial output
and relative prices (e.g. terms of trade).
The mechanism following a productivity shock in the non-traded sector is as follows. Due to
the credit markets imperfections, the non-traded sector rms are required to pledge existing capital
stock, which is denominated in the relative price of the non-traded goods, as collateral. Therefore,
when faced with a productivity shock, value of the collateral decreases causing the rms to be
more constrained. A stricter constraint implies that loans and demand for labor in the non-traded
sector decrease. Under nancial autarky households have no assets, so the only sources of income
they have are from loans and labor supplied to the two sectors. When the demand for loans
and for labor in the non-traded sector decrease, households insure themselves by supplying more
labor to the traded sector. Higher labor supply in the traded sector leads to more output, and
to terms of trade deterioration.3 As a result of the terms of trade deterioration, the consumption
bundle becomes more expensive, dampening the reaction of consumption to productivity shocks.
Under nancial integration, however, households have international assets to insure themselves
with. Therefore, they do not react to the changes in the non-traded sector, and the terms of trade
2In either of these scenarios, the non-traded sector rm owners are not allowed to hold the international portfolios.
3The terms of trade is dened as the ratio of the imported foreign good price to the exported home good price.
Hence, terms of trade deterioration means an increase in this ratio.
2do not move. Without the dampening eect of the terms of trade, reaction of consumption to
productivity changes can be higher, causing aggregate consumption to be more volatile. Higher
consumption volatility under nancial integration is associated with lower levels of welfare in the
aggregate, due to big welfare losses of the non-traded good rm owners, even though the households
are still better o under nancial integration.4
The higher consumption volatility under nancial integration results depend on the degree of
risk-aversion of the households, as well as the elasticity of their labor supply. As the households be-
come more risk-averse, the insurance international nancial assets provide becomes more valuable.
Moreover, as their total labor supply becomes more inelastic, adjusting labor eort becomes more
costly in terms of welfare. In these two cases, the consumption and labor smoothing benets of
nancial integration outweigh the dampening eects of relative prices observed in nancial autarky.
Credit market frictions, similar to the ones depicted in this paper, have widely been used in
explaining nancial crises and instability of small open economies. Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee
(2004), Tornell and Westermann (2002), and Arellano and Mendoza (2002) are a few examples that
focus on such imperfections in the context of small open economies. Because the main goal of this
strand of literature is to understand nancial crises, most of these studies do not look at the role
of domestic nancial frictions in the context of international nancial integration. One exception
is Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2004), who show how capital account liberalization might
destabilize a small country that has an intermediate level of nancial development. In their analysis,
they mainly focus on the volatility of investment and output, and do not discuss the implications for
consumption. Levchenko (2005), on the other hand, focuses on the impact of nancial liberalization
on consumption volatility. He shows that in the countries with underdeveloped nancial markets,
domestic risk-sharing arrangements might deteriorate in the face of nancial integration. As a
results, individual consumptions might become more volatile, but aggregate consumption volatility
will nevertheless decrease.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: next section summarizes some of the empirical
4The result that nancial integration is not necessarily welfare improving to all parties is also discussed by Tille
(2005). He shows that when the goods markets are characterized by rigidities and exchange rate pass-through is
partial, the country with less volatile monetary shocks will lose from integration.
3evidence on nancial openness and consumption volatility. Section 3 presents the model economy.
Section 4 discusses the model parametrization. Section 5 analyzes the frictions in the model and
presents the results. Section 6 looks at sensitivity analysis. Section 7 describes the welfare results.
Finally, section 8 concludes.
2 Review of Empirical Evidence on Financial Integration and Con-
sumption Volatility
There are alternative ways to evaluate the extent of international risk-sharing and benets of nan-
cial integration.5 Financial openness facilitates borrowing and lending opportunities that can help
the consumers smooth domestic shocks, and hence can help the economies achieve lower consump-
tion growth volatilities. Therefore, a direct way to assess the benets of nancial integration is
to analyze the relationship between consumption growth volatility and nancial integration. Since
nancial openness can also aect the volatility of income growth, it is also important to examine the
ratio of consumption growth volatility to GDP growth volatility. This ratio captures an economy's
ability to smooth shocks.
Allowing for an extensive set of control variables, and using data from both the developed
and developing countries, Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003) investigate the relationship between
nancial integration and consumption growth volatility, in addition to the ratio of consumption
growth volatility to GDP growth volatility. As proxies for nancial integration, the authors use
both gross capital 
ows (as a percentage of GDP) and an indicator of restrictions on capital account
transactions. One of the interesting results they obtain is that the consumption growth volatility
relative to output growth volatility is higher for more nancially integrated developing economies
during the 1990s{the decade during which they were nancially more open. Moreover, their results
show that increasing nancial openness is signicantly associated with rising relative volatility of
consumption upto a threshold. Their results imply that smoothing of shocks, and hence reductions
in the ratio of consumption volatility to GDP volatility occur in economies with gross capital 
ows
5See Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2007) for a detailed discussion, and the references within.
4higher than 49%. On the other hand, their results display no signicant relationship between the
volatility of consumption growth and nancial openness.
In a similar set-up, Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2006) investigate the impact of nancial
liberalization on consumption growth volatility, and on the ratio of consumption growth volatility
to GDP growth volatility. As measures of nancial liberalization, they use both the equity market
liberalization measures (ocial liberalization indicator and intensity measure), and capital account
liberalization measures (International Monetary Fund's measure for restrictions on payments for
the capital account transactions and Quinn's openness measure). They nd that the nancial
liberalization is associated with lower consumption growth variability in a large cross-section, and
that the eect of equity market liberalization is larger for countries with relatively more open
capital accounts. When looking at emerging markets only, they do not nd a signicant relationship
between nancial liberalization and consumption growth variability. However, their results show a
reduction in the ratio of consumption growth volatility to GDP growth volatility after equity market
liberalizations in developing countries. The result for the enhanced ability to smooth shocks does
not carry over to other types of capital account liberalizations, as the authors nd a higher ratio
associated with IMF's capital account openness measure.
As illustrated in these two studies, whether consumption growth (in absolute and relative terms)
becomes less volatile with nancial openness depends on the type and intensity of capital 
ows, as
well as certain country characteristics. One of the country characteristics that might play a crucial
role in facilitating consumption smoothing after liberalizations is the level of nancial development.
If the domestic nancial frictions are too prevalent, then the countries might not be able to reap
the benets of nancial openness. The model I present below incorporates some of the domestic
nancial frictions that are present in the developing countries (as documented by Tornell and
Westermann (2002)), and investigates whether these frictions can hamper consumption smoothing
in the case of nancial integration.
53 The Model
This section presents the model for nancial autarky and nancial integration. It is a two-country
model with innitely lived agents. The world is populated with a continuum of agents on the
interval [0,1]. A mass n of households belongs to country H (home), while 1   n belongs to F
(foreign). I assume that home is an emerging market economy with an underdeveloped nancial
system, and foreign is a large economy with perfect nancial markets. Each country produces a
traded and a non-traded good. In the home country, there are two types of consumers: households
and the owners of the non-traded sector rms (from here on NT owners). Households make up
fraction  of the population, own the home traded goods rms, and provide labor to both the
traded and the non-traded goods sectors. NT owners make up fraction 1  of the population, and
they borrow from the households to be able to nance the investment and production of non-traded
goods.
3.1 Consumption Baskets and Price Indices
Both the households and the NT owners consume the same consumption basket, Ct; which is a
















where   0 is the elasticity of substitution between traded and non-traded goods, and 
 is the
share of traded goods in the consumption basket. Consumption of the traded goods, CT; is a














where   0 is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign traded goods. The general
price index for consumption, Pt; the price index for the traded goods, PT;t, and the price index for

















Households consume the consumption basket, own the traded sector rms, provide labor to the
production of traded and non-traded goods, and lend to the non-traded goods rms. The objective






t )   NLN;t   HLH;t] (5)
where Ch
t is the consumption of the household, LN;t and LH;t denote labor supply in the non-traded
and traded sectors, respectively.
3.2.1 Financial Autarky
Under nancial autarky, home households are not allowed to trade any assets with foreign house-
holds. The budget constraint in this case is
PtCh
t + Zh
t  WN;tLN;t + WH;tLH;t + Rt 1Zh
t 1 + t, (6)
where Zh
t is the amount loans given to the non-traded sector, and Rt 1 is the gross interest rate on
the loans, paid in period t. WN;t and WH;t are the wage rates in the traded and non-traded goods
sectors, respectively. t denotes the prots from owning the traded goods rms. The households
choose Ch
t ;Zh
t ;LN;t;LH;t to maximize (5) subject to (6). The rst order conditions give us the
6It must be noted that the model economy is a cashless economy, as in Woodford (2003), where currency only
plays the role of convenient unit of account.


























When the home country is nancially integrated with the foreign country, households can fully
insure themselves against domestic shocks. They are able to do so by holding an international state
contingent portfolio, which yield a return in terms of the foreign country's currency.7;8 The budget





Q(st+1 j st)B(st+1)  WN;tLN;t + WH;tLH;t + Rt 1Zh
t 1 + t + "tB(st) (10)
where st denotes the state of the nature, "t is the nominal exchange rate, B(st) is the market
value of (in units of foreign currency) a portfolio of the state contingent securities held at the end
of period t; and Q(st+1 j st) is the pricing kernel of the state contingent portfolio. In this case,
in addition to the choice variables under nancial autarky, the household also chooses B(st+1) in













5 = 1 (11)
7The assumption of an international state contingent portfolio allows us to analyze the most favorable form of
nancial integration. The mechanism and the results presented hold when I consider a single non-contingent bond.
Results available upon request.
8Having bonds denominated in currency is convenient particularly here, since denomination in units of consumption
would imply implicit trading of foreign non-traded goods.





























The no-arbitrage condition implies that households are indierent between giving out loans to the
non-traded sector rms and holding the international portfolio. The equilibrium amount of loans is
then pinned down by the demand for loans of the NT owners, which is always positive in equilibrium
as discussed in section 3.4.
3.3 Traded Goods Sector
Firms in the traded sector are perfectly competitive, and for simplicity I assume that they produce




H;t   WH;tLH;t (16)
subject to:
YH;t + Y 
H;t = AH;tLH;t (17)
9where YH;t and Y 
H;t are the amounts of traded good sold at home and abroad, LH;t is labor used
in the production, and AH;t is the productivity shock in the traded goods sector. From the rms's








3.4 Non-Traded Goods Sector
There is a continuum of agents, each of whom own a non-traded good rm. They combine labor
services of the households with the capital they own to produce the non-traded good with a Cobb-






where KN is the capital they own, LN is the labor, and AN;t is the productivity shock common to
all non-traded goods rms. The parameter 0    1; denotes the share of labor in the production
of the non-traded goods. Capital stock is augmented by investment, XN;t; with previous period's
non-traded good output allocated to investment in the following way:
XN;t = KN;t   (1   )KN;t 1 (21)
where  is the depreciation rate.9
To be able to invest and produce, NT owners need to get loans each period because they do not
have adequate accumulated assets, or net worth, to undertake the investment. Following Tornell
9Introducing adjustment costs of capital do not change the volatility results presented in the next section; and
they are available upon request.
10and Westermann's (2002) empirical evidence, I assume that the non-traded goods rms cannot
borrow internationally. They rely on the domestic nancial system, mainly on the domestic banks.
I assume that there is a nancial institution, not explicitly modeled, that collects deposits from the
households and lends them out to the NT owners. Furthermore, I assume that the credit contracts
are subject to enforceability problems: if the borrowers have a lot of debt, they can choose to
repudiate the debt contract. The way the nancial institution manages the enforceability problem
is that it requires the rms to pledge collateral in the loan contract.
In setting up the collateral constraint, I follow Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) closely. I assume
that the nancial institution can only collateralize the rm's physical assets {capital stock, because
they do not have the right set of skills, or the rm owner's technology, to operate the rm.10 In
the case of debt repudiation, the nancial institution can liquidate the pledged capital by paying
a transaction cost proportional to the borrower's collateral, and pay back the lenders. Given
the incentive compatibility considerations, the nancial institution only nances rms whose debt
repayment is less than or equal to the expected value of their collateral, net of liquidation costs.
Specically, if the rm owner in total owns capital KN;t period t, then he can borrow Z
o
t , as long
as the total repayment in period t + 1, is less than the amount the nancial institution can get
after liquidation in period t + 1 (net of transaction costs). Therefore, the NT owner's borrowing
constraint can be written as
RtZo
t  mEt(PN;t+1KN;t) (22)
where Rt is the gross interest rate on the loan, and (1   m) is the proportion of collateral that is
paid as the transaction cost. The parameter m represents the severity of the enforceability problem
and therefore the level of nancial development. The higher the parameter m, the less severe the
enforceability problem, and the more relaxed the borrowing constraint is.
10The assumption that only the owners have the right technology to produce the good is taken from Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997). If this assumption is relaxed, then the nancial institution can operate the rm after repudiation
to obtain the output for that period. In this set-up, the borrowing constraint can be tied to the current value of
output rather than the value of capital. The dynamics emerging in that model does not rely on the role of asset price
movements in the reallocation and amplication mechanism presented in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Without that
particular reallocation mechanism, the results described below do not hold.













t 1 + WN;tLN;t  PN;tYN;t + Z
o
t ; (24)
and the borrowing constraint in (22). The consumption bundle C
o
t is the same as the household's
consumption bundle and is given by (1) and (2). I assume that the discount factor of the NT
owners, ; is smaller than the discount factor of the worker households, : As shown by Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1997), this assumption ensures that the borrowers will not be able to accumulate
adequate assets, and be borrowing constrained in the steady state.
The rst order conditions to the NT owner's problem with respect to C
o





































  Et ft+1g (28)
where t is the lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint and t is the multiplier on the borrowing
constraint. There are two important things to note. First, equation (28) in the steady state implies
that t is always greater than zero since 1
R =  and  >  . Therefore, the borrowing constraint
is always binding in and around the steady state. To ensure that the borrowing constraint is
12binding around the deterministic steady state, I assume that the variance of the stochastic shock
processes are suciently small. The fact that the borrowing constraint is always binding and the
optimality conditions jointly identify the amount of loans demanded in equilibrium. Secondly,
the eective interest rate that the NT owners face, i.e., inverse of their intertemporal price of
consumption, is higher than the domestic interest rate. Substituting equation (25) into equation



















which is greater than Rt: Equation (29) implies that, the higher the marginal benet of borrowing
(t), the higher the eective interest rate NT owners face.
3.5 Foreign Country
The foreign country is populated with a representative household who owns both the traded and
non-traded goods rms, provide labor to both sectors and consume the consumption bundle. The











































F;t + B(st) + 
t , (34)
and the additional optimality condition is:







The problem of a representative foreign traded goods rm is symmetric to the home traded







I assume that the law of one price holds also for the foreign goods, so I get PF;t = "tP
F;t:
The non-traded goods rms in the foreign country are owned by the foreign households, there-
fore, they are not constrained in their borrowing. The objective of the competitive non-traded





























and the capital accumulation equation
X
N;t = K
N;t   (1   )K
N;t 1: (40)
































The equilibrium is dened as a sequence of endogenous prices and quantities that solve all the agents'
and rms' optimization problems and satisfy the market clearing conditions. Market clearing
conditions in the traded and non-traded goods sectors are given by:
nCH;t + (1   n)C
H;t = YH;t + Y 
H;t (43)
nCF;t + (1   n)C
F;t = YF;t + Y 
F;t (44)





Aggregate home consumption is dened as the sum of households' and NT owners' consumption:
Ct = Ch
t + (1   )Co: (47)
Finally, the loan market clearing at home implies:
Zh




The quarterly discount factor of the workers, ; is set equal to 0.99, which implies a real interest
rate of 4 percent, and the discount factor of the NT owners, ; is set to 0.98. The weight of labor
eorts in the utility, N and H are assumed to be constant across the two sectors, and set equal to
1. Since the home country is assumed to be a small country and the foreign country can be thought
of as the rest of the world, home country's size parameter n is assumed to be 0.05. The share of
labor in the production of tradable, ; and the depreciation rate  are taken from Backus, Kehoe
and Kydland (1992) and are set equal to 0.64 and 0.025, respectively. The elasticity of substitution
between tradable and non-tradable goods, ; is taken from Stockman and Tesar (1995) to be 0.5,
and the share of traded goods in the consumption basket, 
; is set equal to 0.5. The elasticity
of substitution between home and foreign tradable goods, ; is chosen to be 1.5 following Backus,
Kehoe and Kydland (1994).
Two key parameters in this analysis is the share of households in the population, ; and the
debt to collateral ratio, m: To start with I choose  to be 0.8, and m to be 0.8, so that the implied
quarterly debt to GDP ratio in the steady state is 0.07. The particular choice of m and  makes
the implied annual debt to GDP ratio equal to the mean credit to private sector to GDP ratio of
58 non-OECD countries.11 I try dierent values for m and  to show how the credit constraints
on the non-traded sector's borrowing and the existence of NT owners who do not have access to
international asset markets aect the results.
Following the real business cycle literature, I set the autocorrelation of the shocks in the traded
and the non-traded sectors equal to 0.95. Following Baxter and Crucini (1995), I assume that
the standard deviation of the shocks to the traded sector (at home and in the foreign country) is
0.007. Most estimates in literature shows that the standard deviation of productivity shocks to the
non-tradable sector is roughly half of the standard deviation to the tradable sector. In line with
those ndings, I set the standard deviation of the productivity shocks equal to 0.0035.12 Baxter
11The data is from the World Development Indicators. The list of countries is available upon request.
12One can assume that the productivity shocks are more volatile in the emerging markets. Increasing the standard
deviation of shocks in the home country, aects consumption and output volatility under autarky more than under
integration. However, the qualitative results do not change. Results available upon request.
16and Crucini (1995) nds little evidence for spillover eects in technology shocks, so I assume there
are no spillover eects. I also assume that the productivity shocks are not correlated across sectors
or countries.13
5 Access to International Financial Markets, Sectorial Dierences
and Volatility
The model presented features two credit market imperfections. The rst is the existence of a set
of agents, NT owners, who do not have access to international nancial markets even when the
asset markets are integrated. The second is the credit constraint the non-traded goods rms face
due to enforceability problems. These frictions make the output and the prices in the non-traded
sector inherently more volatile. Access to international nancial markets allows households to
share the risks that are amplied by the nancial imperfections. In the absence of international
risk-sharing opportunities, households can secure themselves only by adjusting labor eort, which
has repercussions on sectorial output and relative prices.
To illustrate the relationship between access to international asset markets and relative prices,
consider the relation between the real exchange rate and the consumption dierential between the
two countries under nancial integration.14 When the agents can trade state contingent assets
internationally, the real exchange rate will be proportional to the ratio of the marginal utilities of









where qt is the real exchange rate and is dened as qt =
"tP
t
Pt :  is a constant that captures the
initial state of the economies. Following Chari et. al (2001), I assume that the net foreign asset
13I have made sensitivity analyses with respect to the standard deviation of the productivity shocks in the non-
tradable sector and correlation of shocks across sectors. The qualitative results remain the same in all these sensitivity
analyses. Results are available upon request.
14This link was also highlighted by Tille (2005).
17position of the two countries initially is zero, so that  = 1: The log-linearized version of (49) is
^ qt = ^ Ch
t   ^ C
t ; (50)
which implies that the 
uctuations in the real exchange rate are associated with the consumption
dierential between the households and foreigners.
Under nancial autarky, there is no trade in assets; therefore, the trade in goods must be
balanced each period. The balanced trade condition requires the value of the imports at home to
be equal to the values of exports:
nPF;tCF;t = (1   n)"tP
H;tC
H;t (51)
Substituting in the expressions for the relative prices from the rms' optimization and consumption
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and C are the steady state values of households' and NT owners' consumption
and aggregate consumption, respectively. The linearized version of the balanced trade condition
implies that the dynamics of the real exchange rate is not only associated with the consumption
dierential between the households and the foreigners but also between the NT owners and the
foreigners. The inherent volatility of NT owners' consumption due to credit constraints and their
lack of international insurance is re
ected onto volatility of the real exchange rate, and onto relative
prices. Also, ; the share of households' in the population is an important determinant of the
dynamics under nancial autarky and integration.
The quantitative results from the model are presented in Table 2. The standard deviation of
aggregate consumption under nancial autarky is 0.4371, where as it is 0.5839 under integration.
In addition to generating a higher volatility of consumption volatility, the model also generates a
18higher relative volatility of consumption to output under integration, implying that a better ability
to smooth consumption under nancial autarky. The ratio of standard deviations of consumption
to output are 0.2037 and it is 0.1708, respectively under nancial integration and autarky. For
the given parametrization, the model suggests that if a small country has a malfunctioning nan-
cial system with unequal access to international markets and enforceability problems, despite the
premises of risk-sharing, international nancial integration can yield higher consumption volatility.
5.1 Asymmetric Credit Conditions and Terms of Trade Dynamics
To illustrate how relative prices are smoothed out under nancial integration, allowing consumption
to be more responsive to shocks, I analyze the dynamic behavior of the economy following a
productivity shock in the domestic non-traded sector. Figure 1 shows the responses to a 1% shock
that decays with a coecient of 0.95. First, both under nancial integration and autarky, the real
wage in the non-traded (from now on NT) sector increases. Labor mobility between the two sectors
causes the wage rate to increase also in the traded goods sector. Secondly, the positive supply
shock causes the relative price of the non-traded goods to decrease. The NT owners' borrowing
is constrained by the value of their capital stock which is denominated in the price of non-traded
goods. Lower relative price of the non-traded goods causes the value of the non-traded goods rm's
collateral to decrease, making them more credit constrained.
The result that rms become more constrained following a positive shock is due to rst the fact
that the pledged collateral is capital, which is augmented by the NT output itself (hence the price
of the output and collateral are the same); and second due to the asymmetric information between
the borrowers and the nancial institution. The nancial institution cannot observe the realization
of the shock, but can observe the value of the collateral. The positive supply shock derives the
price of the NT good down, which in return lowers the value of the collateral. With lower value of
collateral, the rm owners borrow less, and as a result invest less and demand less labor.
This mechanism is dierent from the amplication mechanisms presented in Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997), Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) or Kocherlakota (2000). In all three papers, the collateral the
rm pledges is a non-reproducible factor, whose price is dierent from the price of the output.
19Hence, what moves asset prices in their mechanisms is not directly the supply shocks, but rather
changes in demand for the non-reproducible factor. A negative shock reduces the extent of pro-
duction, which leads the rms to demand fewer inputs. A lower demand for the inputs derives the
price of the collateral down, leading the rms to be more constrained. A second dierence from
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) is that in their set up the constrained
and unconstrained rms produce the same good, and the borrowing constraint leads to reallocation
of resources between the dierent types of producers of the same good. In this paper's set-up, all
the NT rms are borrowing constrained, and the traded good producers are not. Therefore, the
model yields a reallocation mechanism between the traded goods sector and the non-traded goods
sector as a result of the reaction of the households to the changes in the non-traded sector.
Households are aected by the changes in the non-traded goods sector in two ways. First,
the amount of loans they supply decreases, meaning they will have less income from lending in
the next period. Secondly, the amount of income they get from the NT sector decreases due to
the lower demand for labor in that sector. Without any access to international borrowing under
nancial autarky, the only way the workers can increase consumption in response to the positive
productivity shock is by increasing labor eorts in the traded goods sector. Increase in the labor
eort causes the home traded good to become relatively more abundant, causing its relative price
to decrease. When the home traded good becomes relatively cheaper, the terms of trade (the price
of home imports over price of exports) worsens. The deterioration in the terms of trade causes the
home consumption bundle to become relatively more expensive, causing a dampening eect on the
increase in consumption. As a result, terms of trade deterioration under nancial autarky mitigates
the reaction of consumption to the productivity shock, causing consumption to be less volatile.
Under nancial integration, however, the households have access to assets that they can insure
themselves with. Therefore, they do not react to the fall in loans and labor demand in the NT sector
by increasing labor eort in the traded sector, but rather by borrowing from abroad. Consequently,
the labor supply and thus the output in the traded sector does not increase, leaving the terms
of trade constant. Without any change in the terms of trade, the consumption increases by a
larger percentage under nancial integration than under autarky, causing consumption to be more
20volatile.
Another way to see how terms of trade eects causes the consumption to be less volatile under
autarky, is by comparing (52) to (50), the two equations that constitute the main dierence between
the dynamics of the two set-ups. Notice that equation (52) simplies in the limit to (50) as  ! 1:
As  approaches innity, the home and the foreign traded goods become perfect substitutes. This
suggests that, under nancial autarky, when the home good becomes more abundant and relatively
cheaper after a positive productivity shock, all the home consumers would consume only H and not
F: The terms of trade eects disappear and the dynamics under nancial integration and autarky
coincide.15
While the described transmission mechanism oers a prediction as to why consumption might be
less reactive to productivity shocks under nancial autarky, there are two dimensions it seems to be
inconsistent with some stylized facts. First, the model suggests that the positive productivity shock
leads to a decline in the labor input, investment and hence output in the non-traded sector on the
impact of the shock. The prediction that labor demand and investment can decline on the impact
of a positive technology shock is consistent with Basu, Fernald and Kimball (2006). However,
their ndings also show that output changes little on impact, which contradicts the response of
non-traded output in the model. Secondly, as documented in Table 3, the model predicts that
consumption of the households are weakly countercyclical, while the consumption of the NT rm
owners are strongly procyclical. The strong procyclicality of the latter re
ects the fact that the
NT rm owners do not have any other assets to smooth their consumption patterns; hence, their
consumption is very tightly linked to the movements in output. The households' consumption
increases, due to higher wages, as the non-traded output decreases. The increase in traded output
under autarky is not enough to generate an increase in GDP on impact, and therefore, consumption
and GDP move in the opposite directions.
15Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2003) also note, in a dierent set up with tradable and non-tradable goods, that
agents can achieve complete market results under nancial autarky through terms of trade movements.
215.2 The Severity of the Enforceability Problem
An interesting experiment is to see how the results are aected by the severity of the credit market
imperfections. Figure 2 plots the relative volatility of consumption to output across dierent
values of m (ranging from 0.1 to 1). Higher values of m corresponds to a higher level of nancial
development since the borrowing constraint is relaxed and the rms can borrow more. Relaxing
the borrowing constraint decreases the relative volatility of consumption for both nancial autarky
and integration. However it is not sucient to reverse the results and have nancial integration
less volatile. In essence, m = 1 means that the NT rms can borrow up to the full value of their
collateral, still imposing a restriction on their borrowing. Therefore, setting m equal to 1 does not
correspond to a case without the credit market imperfections.16
5.3 Asymmetric Access to International Assets
Another interesting extension would be to see the impact of the number of NT owners. Ideally
one would like to disentangle the impact of dierent frictions in the model on the volatility results
by varying : However, the parameter (1  ) simultaneously governs the share of the population
that is left out of international asset markets and the size of the non-traded sector. The impacts
of varying  might be driven by changes in the size of the non-traded sector or by changes in the
share of population that has access to international risk-sharing.
In this experiment, I set  equal to 0.9999.17 This parametrization implies that the home
population is made up of mainly households who all have access to international asset markets
under nancial integration, and that the non-traded sector is very small in the home country. As
can be seen from the results in Table 4, output becomes more volatile in both set-ups, more so
under autarky. Under integration, consumption volatilities do not change by much, but under
autarky NT owners consumption become signicantly more volatile and households' consumption
become slightly more volatile.
16 In the steady state m = 1:0101 makes the NT owners' consumption zero. Therefore, the maximum value I can
give to m is a little larger than 1 to ensure nonnegativity of NT owners' consumption.
17 The model cannot be solved for  = 1; therefore I set  = 0:9999; to bring the model as close to a standard
model as possible.
226 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, I analyze sensitivity of the results to the choice of the coecient of risk-aversion,
elasticity of substitution between traded and non-traded goods, elasticity of substitution between
home and foreign goods, elasticity of labor supply, and substitutability of labor across the two




















where ! is the coecient of relative risk aversion, 1
 is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, and
1
' is the elasticity of substitution between the labor eorts in the two sectors. The results in the
previous section are obtained under the special parametrization where ! = 1,  = 0 and ' = 0:
Hence, the benchmark parametrization implies that the households are relatively less risk-averse,
labor is perfectly elastic, and the labor eorts supplied to the two sectors are perfect substitutes.
Since risk-sharing and labor reallocation across the two sectors constitute the important components
of the transmission mechanism, I analyze how the results change when I assume a higher degree
of risk-aversion, relatively inelastic degree of labor supply, and imperfect substitutability of labor
between the two sectors.
Given the general form of the utility function in (53), the linearized risk-sharing condition (for
nancial integration) in (50) becomes
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23where o:t: stands for the terms involving the deviation of foreign labor eorts away from their steady
states, which are negligible following home country shocks. Since equations (54) and (55) are the
main dierences between the dynamics under nancial integration and autarky, the dynamics and
the volatilities under the two set-ups will depend on the parameters !;, ,  and ':
First, I analyze the sensitivity of results to the coecient of risk-aversion, keeping the as-
sumption that labor is perfectly elastic and labor eorts in the two sectors are perfect substitutes
( = 0;' = 0): Table 5 shows the results for dierent values of !; keeping  and  at their initial
values (0.5 and 1.5, respectively). The nding that nancial integration can increase volatility of
consumption holds for ! equal to 2 and 3. The second nding that relative volatility of consumption
to output volatility is higher under nancial integration does not hold for ! equal to 2 nor 3. As
people become more risk-averse, the benets of risk-sharing for households outweigh the costs of
worsening terms of trade, and they can better cushion themselves against domestic shocks through
international assets.
A common choice of coecient of risk aversion in the literature is 2. Therefore, I try to see if
there is a plausible value of  that would make the relative volatility of consumption lower under
nancial autarky for ! equal to 2.18 The last panel of Table 6 shows that  needs to be 0.3, to
recover the nding that relative volatility of consumption can be higher under nancial integration.
Keeping everything else constant, as the traded and non-traded goods become less substitutable, the
terms of trade and real exchange dynamics gain more importance for the consumption dynamics. As
a result, the terms of trade responses to productivity shocks provide better consumption smoothing
opportunities, even if households are slightly more risk-averse.19 In short, if one assumes that the
traded and the non-traded goods in developing countries is slightly less substitutable than what
the literature assumes (usually for developed countries), the main ndings of the paper is robust
to choosing a risk aversion coecient of 2.
Next, I investigate the sensitivity of the results to the choice of elasticity of labor, still keeping
18 I also tried dierent values of  for this purpose. The results are not sensitive to the choice of :
19In the limiting case where the traded and the non-traded goods are perfect substitutes ( ! 1), the terms of
trade and real exchange dynamics lose all their importance in explaining the cross-country consumption dierentials,
since ^ q ! 0:
24the assumption of perfect substitutability of the labor eorts. When labor is relatively more
inelastic, it becomes more costly for the workers to adjust labor eorts to insure themselves against
productivity shocks. Therefore, they might not be able to smooth-consumption through labor
movements as much. The middle panel in Table 7 presents the results for a common choice for
the Frisch elasticity of 2 ( = 0:5) keeping other parameters at their initial values. When labor
is relatively more inelastic, both consumption and labor volatilities relative to output are smaller
under integration. Hence, when adjusting labor eort is more costly in terms of welfare, changes
in labor do not lead to suciently large movements in the relative prices that would dampen

uctuations in consumption.
Finally, I analyze the importance of substitutability of labor eorts across the two sectors in
understanding the role of labor allocation across the two sectors in the consumption smoothing
process. I follow Horvath (2000) in specifying the substitutability in the labor preferences. The
fact that labor eorts in the two sectors are not perfect substitutes implies a certain degree of
labor specicity in the two sectors. The lower the degree of substitutability, the more dicult
it can be for the workers to insure themselves by reallocating labor eorts from the non-traded
sector to the traded one. Keeping the other parameters at their benchmark values, I present the
volatility results for the elasticity of substitution equal to 2 (' = 0:5) in the lower panel of Table 7.
When it is more dicult to reallocate labor eorts across the sectors, total labor eort and output
becomes less volatile, whereas consumption becomes more volatile. The same pattern is observed
under both autarky and integration, and imperfect substitutability is not enough to hinder the
consumption-smoothing eects of labor movements and relative prices.
7 Welfare Results
To see if the higher volatility under nancial integration leads to lower welfare results, I evaluate
the welfare criteria for autarky and integration. Following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004), and
Kim and Kim (2003), I solve the model using second order approximation.20 The welfare criteria I
use is the unconditional expectation of the second order Taylor expansion of agents' utility. Given
20 I solve the model using the procedure adopted by Collard and Juillard (2001) in the package Dynare.
25the utility function for the workers in (5) and the utility function for the NT owners in (23), the
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The upper panel of Table 8 presents the welfare gains and losses. When I evaluate the wel-
fare criterion for the households under nancial autarky and integration, I get 0.6643 and 1.0433,
respectively. Even though the volatility of the households' consumption is higher, their welfare
is still higher under nancial integration due to the insurance the assets bring. The risk-sharing
under nancial integration allows the households to have less disutility from labor, since they adjust
their asset holdings rather than labor eort in the face of shocks.21 On the other hand, the NT
owners are better o under nancial autarky. Their welfare loss is 9.5386 and 11.8861, respectively
under autarky and integration. NT owners are worse o under integration not only because their
consumption is more volatile, but also because they are left out of risk-sharing. For the aggregate
welfare measure, I use the weighted sum of the welfare of the two groups, where the weights are
the size of the workers and the NT owners in the economy. The weighted sum of the welfare of
the two types of households is -1.3763 and -1.5443 under autarky and integration, respectively.
The fact that the welfare losses of the NT owners are much bigger under integration causes the
aggregate welfare to be lower under integration. Thus, transition from autarky to integration is
not Pareto-optimal under the parametrization of the model.
Finally, I assess the extent of risk-sharing opportunities under nancial autarky. Cole and
Obstfeld (1991) show that, under certain restrictive parametrizations, the terms of trade responses
to productivity shocks provide perfect insurance. With log-utility, perfect insurance implies that
the correlation between the real exchange rate and the ratio of domestic to foreign consumption
is equal to 1 (see equation 50). The correlations between the real exchange rate and the relative
21The expected level of labor disutility is higher under autarky, which causes the welfare number to be smaller
despite a lower level of consumption volatility.
26consumptions are presented in the lower panel of Table 8. Given the benchmark parameterization
of the model, the correlation between the real exchange rate with the ratio of household to foreign
consumption is 0.4389 under autarky. Hence, for the households, the terms of trade dynamics
bring about a little less than half insurance. It is also interesting to note that, the risk-sharing
opportunities for the NT owners worsens under integration, as the correlation between the real
exchange rate and the ratio of NT owners' consumption to foreign consumption becomes more
negative. This complements the results on larger welfare losses for the NT owners under integration.
8 Conclusion
This paper illustrates how domestic nancial frictions can alter the standard predictions about the
lower variability of consumption under nancial integration. The results show that, given certain
parametrizations, consumption volatility (in absolute terms and as a ration of GDP volatility) is
lower under nancial autarky. The nancial frictions make the non-traded sector inherently more
volatile. Under nancial integration, households can insure themselves against these 
uctuations
in the non-traded sector with international assets. This insurance helps them to keep their labor
eorts unchanged, which allows the 
uctuations in the relative prices and terms of trade to be
smoothed out. With smoother terms of trade, aggregate consumption can respond fully to the
productivity changes. When the international assets do not exist, however, households react to
changes in the non-traded sector by supplying more labor to the traded sector, which results in the
deterioration of terms of trade. The deterioration of terms of trade under autarky has dampening
eects on aggregate consumption, causing it to have lower volatility. Despite their more volatile
consumption, the households are still better o in terms of welfare under nancial integration due
to risk-sharing. The NT owners, however, have lower welfare under integration because they are
left out of risk-sharing. Also, the aggregate welfare is lower under nancial integration.
The model depicted is a highly stylized one that highlights the role of domestic nancial frictions
in determining the consequences of international nancial integration for consumption smoothing.
While the volatility results are consistent with some empirical evidence, the model's some other
predictions are at odds with the data (such as counter-cyclicality of consumption). Moreover, the
27set-up relies on a high degree of labor elasticity to generate the high volatility reults. Therefore,
the channels identied should not be taken as exhaustive explanations for the higher volatility and
nancial integration relationship found in some of the empirical studies, but rather as a demonstra-
tion for how credit market imperfections can alter consumption smoothing mechanisms. Studying
alternative forms of credit credit market imperfections, and enriching the demand side of the model
can be useful in identifying and assessing other possible channels.
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32Table 1: Benchmark Parameters
Discount factor of the workers  = 0:99
Discount factor of the entrepreneurs  = 0:98
Weight of labor eort in the utility N = H = 1
Home country's size n = 0:05
Elasticity of substitution between tradables and nontradables  = 0:5
Share of tradables in the consumption basket 
 = 0:5
Elasticity of substitution between home and foreign tradable goods  = 1:5
Share of labor in the production of tradables  = 0:64
Depreciation rate  = 0:025
Share of workers in the population  = 0:8
Debt to collateral ratio m = 0:8
Standard deviation of productivity shocks to the tradable sector T = 0:007
Standard deviation of productivity shocks to the non-tradable sector N = 0:0035
33Table 2: Implied Volatilities of the Model
%std:dev %std:dev
%std:dev of Y
Y C Ch Co C L q
Autarky 2.5596 0.4371 0.4430 5.4275 0.1708 0.9925 0.1912
Integration 2.8669 0.5839 0.5896 6.1097 0.2037 0.9803 0.1512
Notes:
 Y =GDP, C =aggregate consumption, Ch = workers' consumption, Co = NT owners' consumption,
L =total labor supply, q =real exchange rate
 The results are obtained for the benchmark parametrization in Table 1.
Table 3: Implied Correlations
correlations with GDP
C Ch Co L X q tot
Autarky -0.0598 -0.1045 0.9698 0.9859 0.9785 -0.7683 -0.2425
Integration -0.0189 -0.0553 0.9746 0.9783 0.9722 -0.8398 -0.3916
Notes:
 The correlations are obtained for the benchmark parametrization in Table 1.
Table 4: Implied Volatilities of the Limiting Case,  = 0:9999;m = 0:8
%std:dev %std:dev
%std:dev of Y
Y C Ch Co C L q
Autarky 2.7697 0.4494 0.4494 5.9138 0.1623 0.9870 0.1802
Integration 2.9123 0.5895 0.5895 6.0962 0.2024 0.9879 0.1474
Notes:
 All the other parameters are kept at their values tabulated in Table 1, except for  and m:
34Table 5:Sensitivity of the results to the coecient of risk-aversion, !
! = 1 ! = 2 ! = 3
%std:dev of C
Autarky 0.4371 0.2271 0.1566
Integration 0.5839 0.3401 0.2049
%std:dev of C
%std:dev of Y
Autarky 0.1708 0.1294 0.1035
Integration 0.2037 0.1175 0.0874
Notes:
 The rst column re-reports the results for the benchmark parameter values in Table 2. For the last
two columns, all the parameter values except for ! are kept at their benchmark values.
Table 6: Sensitivity of the results to the elasticity between tradables and non-tradables, 
 = 0:5  = 0:4  = 0:3
%std:dev of C
Autarky 0.2271 0.2326 0.2383
Integration 0.3401 0.3497 0.3220
%std:dev of C
%std:dev of Y
Autarky 0.1294 0.1099 0.0922
Integration 0.1175 0.1078 0.0973
Notes:
 The rst column re-reports the results in Table 5 for ! = 2. For the last two columns, ! = 2, and the
other parameters are kept at their benchmark values.
35Table 7: Sensitivity of the results to the elasticity of labor supply ( 1
)




 = 0; = 0 C L Y C L
Autarky 0.4371 2.5404 2.5596 0.1708 0.9925
Integration 0.5839 2.8104 2.8669 0.2037 0.9803
 = 0:5; = 0
Autarky 0.4373 0.9564 1.4143 0.3092 0.6762
Integration 0.5975 1.4193 2.2154 0.2697 0.6495
 = 0; = 0:5
Autarky 0.4498 1.1837 1.9928 0.2257 0.5940
Integration 0.6227 1.3259 2.3424 0.2658 0.5660
Notes:
 The rst panel re-reports the results for the benchmark parameter values in Table 2. For the lower
two panels, all the parameter values except for  and  are kept at their benchmark values.
Table 8: Welfare Results
Welfare Gains and Losses
C Ch Co
Autarky -1.3763 0.6643 -9.5386
Integration -1.5443 1.0433 -11.8861







Autarky 0.4179 0.4389 -0.7885
Integration 0.9786 1 -0.8879
Notes:
 The rst panel presents the numbers obtained by evaluating the welfare criteria in equations 56 and
57 in the text for the benchmark parameters.
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